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Abstract 
 
Consider an economy populated by males and females, both rich and poor. The society has to 
choose one of the following marriage institutions: polygyny, strict monogamy, and serial 
monogamy (divorce and remarriage). After having identified the conditions under which each of 
these equilibria exists, we show that a rise in the share of rich males can explain a change of 
regime from polygyny to monogamy. The introduction of serial monogamy follows from a further 
rise in either the proportion of rich males, or an increase in the proportion of rich females. Strict 
monogamy is a prerequisite to serial monogamy, as it promotes the upward social mobility of 
females more than polygyny. We also show that polygyny is compatible with democracy. 
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1 Introduction
Mating and marriage institutions have dramatically changed over the history of mankind, and
this evolution has attracted the attention of intellectuals since the classical contributions of
Westermarck (1925) and Russell (1929). It is still unclear whether primitive human communi-
ties started off as monogamous or polygamous.1 However, as soon as economic motives became
of some importance, most powerful and wealthy men aimed to have as many wives as possible
and enjoy large reproductive success. The early prevalence of polygynous mating is attested
to by genetic analysis (Hammer et al. 2008), which finds evidence of a female bias throughout
human history in six populations from the Human Genome Diversity Panel.2 Polygynous mat-
ing eventually evolved into polygynous marriage, which has long been the dominating marriage
institution in human societies, and still characterizes a majority of contemporaneous traditional
societies, as confirmed by several ethnographic studies.3
At some point, in Western societies, polygyny has been replaced by monogamy. When this
exactly occurred is still subject to debate, as will further discussed in Section 2.1. However,
after the medieval spread of Christianity, it became virtually impossible for men to simulta-
neously father different children from multiple women, and remarriage was only possible after
widowhood. This kind of strict monogamy was progressively institutionalized and enforced, as
confirmed by the deterioration of the status of illegitimate children (Brundage 1987; Boswell
1988).
More recently, however, the introduction of divorce and the possibility of remarriage has driven
a transition from monogamy to what we call serial monogamy: an institutional setting in which
men can again have children with different women (and vice versa), but not simultaneously.
Serial monogamy essentially started off as an intertemporal version of polygyny, in which
divorce was usually initiated by men. With the gradual instatement of no-fault and unilateral
divorce, and the progressive extension of the right to divorce to women, serial monogamy has
become an intertemporal kind of polygamy.4
1For example, population geneticists like Hammer et al. (2008) claim that humans, and their primate fore-
fathers, were originally at least mildly polygynous, while the anthropologist Todd (2011) argues that, at origin,
the human family was nuclear, with the parental couple as an elementary particle.
2This type of evidence is further discussed by Emery, Felsenstein, and Akey (2010), who show that the
female bias is robust if one goes back far enough into the past.
3In Murdoch’s ethnographic atlas, out of 1231 societies, 186 were monogamous, 453 had occasional polygyny,
588 had more frequent polygyny, while 4 practiced polyandry (Gould, Moav, and Simhon 2008).
4For the sake of completeness, it might be useful to recall that polygamy is a more general definition
encompassing both polygyny (one man marrying multiple wives) and polyandry (one woman marrying multiple
husbands). Throughout this paper, however, we will sometimes use the terms ”polygamy” and ”polygyny”
interchangeably, since the analysis of polyandry is outside our scope. Models of polyandry do however exist
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Social scientists, including some economists, have provided separate explanations for the tran-
sition from polygyny to monogamy and for the emergence of serial monogamy. Broadly speak-
ing, we can regroup the economic theories on the emergence of monogamy, which will be more
extensively surveyed in Section 2.2, to three broad categories: the ”female choice”, “male com-
promise” and “male choice” theories. According to the “female choice” explanation (Lagerlo¨f
2005), monogamy replaces polygyny as soon as inequality among males falls below a certain
threshold, and women prefer to marry monogamously. The ”male compromise” interpretation
of monogamy (as formalized by Lagerlo¨f 2010) sees the ban on polygyny as a device put in
place by rich males in order to protect themselves against the threat of rebellion. Finally, the
“male choice” theory (Gould, Moav, and Simhon 2008) suggests that monogamy might have
emerged as a consequence of a stronger preference of men for skilled, more expensive wives, as
a consequence of the rise in the value of quality, rather than quantity, of children. As far as
divorce is concerned, we have many economic theories of rational divorce inspired by Becker,
Landes, and Michael (1977), but a theory of the introduction of divorce laws is apparently
missing.5
In this paper, we impose additional discipline on the analysis: in particular, we aim to provide
a unified theory of marriage institutions which considers the two transitions as part of the same
dynamic process of social change. The term “unified” refers to Galor (2011)’s Unified Growth
Theory, in the sense that our theory captures in a single analytical framework the whole process
of the transformation of marriage institutions, where transition between regimes is spontaneous
and does not require the intervention of external shocks.
To do this, we explain the evolution of marriage institutions inside a politico-economic frame-
work: at every period, men and women vote over the institutional framework regulating mar-
riage. Polygyny, monogamy and serial monogamy are mutually exclusive: only one of these
three regimes can emerge as a political equilibrium (notice that the polygyny regime allows for
monogamous marriages). Since the (majority) voting process serves as a device to aggregate
possible conflicting preferences, our theory reconciles all the existing theories on the emergence
of monogamy and provides the first attempt to analyze the political economy of divorce laws.
Before describing the core economic mechanism of our model, it might be useful to clarify
(see for instance Korn 2000), and show that polyandry may arise under very special conditions. As confirmed
by Marlowe (2000), polyandry in fact occurs in a tiny minority of human societies.
5Chiappori and Weiss (2006) propose a general equilibrium theory of divorce and remarriage, in which higher
aggregate divorce rates may raise welfare (not including children), since it facilitates remarriage. Barham,
Devlin, and Yang (2009) have a theory of rational marriage and divorce: they develop a model of household
formation and dissolution in which it might be perfectly rational for individuals to marry, even if they fully
anticipate that they will subsequently divorce. Neither of these papers discuss, however, the emergence of
divorce laws. A first attempt to provide a theory of endogenous divorce laws can be found in Hiller and
Recoules (2010).
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that monogamy replaced polygyny well before the transition to universal suffrage. However,
as will discussed in Section 2.3, there is convincing evidence that the interests of women and
lower-status men had some kind of political representation even when (formal) voting rights
were denied to these social groups. It can also be argued that women’s interests might have
been defended by men, namely fathers, who had important stakes in their daughters’ marriages.
Edlund and Lagerlo¨f (2006) show that, in preindustrial societies, marriages were largely decided
by parents whose utility depended on the marriage outcome of their children. This argument
echoes the mechanism put forward by Doepke and Tertilt (2009) to explain why the legal rights
of women improved well before they obtained the right to vote. Finally, it seems to us that all
the explanations of the emergence of monogamy based on the “male compromise” theory, such
as Lagerlo¨f (2010), Betzig (1986) and Alexander (1979), implicitly recognize that, although
they lack formal voting rights, lower status males might retain de facto some political power
(justified by the threat of revolution, the property of production factors, etc.).
If all agents involved in the marriage market have some kind of political representation, the
prevailing form of marriage institutions necessarily depends on the endogenous size of interest
groups. We will distinguish four groups: rich and poor males, and rich and poor females.
Income here has a broad definition: by rich we mean persons having either physical assets (land
or capital) or human assets (network of relationships, education) on top of embodied capital
(strength, genes). In a society characterized by few rich males and virtually no rich females,
polygyny would be supported by a coalition of rich males, who could naturally monopolize
a larger number of partners, and poor females, who would prefer to be the n-th wife of a
rich male rather than marrying a poor male monogamously. Under polygyny, rich males have
a large quantity of children. Given that the father spends a small fraction of his resources
on each child, and resources are crucial for the inter-generational transmission of skills, the
proportion of rich (skilled) individuals increases very slowly over time. Eventually, however,
male-resource inequality decreases enough, and poor females prefer to marry monogamously.
The latter would then form a coalition with poor males in order to support monogamy as a
socially imposed regime. Monogamy is more conducive to human capital accumulation since
fathers can devote more resources to the education of each of their children. As a consequence,
more females and/or more males have access to higher incomes, until serial monogamy prevails.
This kind of mechanism characterizes monogamy as a pre-condition for serial monogamy, and
explains why a direct transition from polygyny to its inter-temporal version does not occur.
In our analysis, a key role is played by possible outcomes on the marriage market. Under
monogamy, people can marry only once in their lifetime and raise children only inside that
marriage. Under polygyny, a male can be married to two females simultaneously, and have
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children with every wife. Under serial (or sequential) monogamy, both males and females can
have more than one spouse in their lifetime, although not simultaneously. We further assume
that resources are equally split between spouses (which, together with a jealousy cost, makes
females adverse to polygyny) and divorce is costly, but allows spouses to break a marriage which
goes bad. Given this, serial monogamy can, for instance, be supported by poor females if there
are enough rich males, and thus the probability of re-marrying with a rich male after a divorce
is fairly high. Serial monogamy can also emerge because it is supported by a coalition of the
rich, as soon as there is a sufficiently high number of skilled individuals in the society. In fact,
rich individuals can afford the cost of divorce and benefit from the possibility of breaking an
“unhappy” marriage; in particular, rich females do not lose status after remarriage, since they
are outnumbered by rich males. Based on these mechanisms, our model helps us to understand
the historical evidence: polygyny is replaced by monogamy as the economy develops, and serial
monogamy emerges at later stages of development.
From a technical point of view, our model contributes to the existing literature on marriage
and family economics along two additional directions. First, we supply a politico-economy
explanation of divorce laws, which is still missing. Second, we offer a more complete charac-
terization of the equilibrium of a polygynous marriage market, allowing for different levels of
heterogeneity among males and females. In this respect, we go beyond Lagerlo¨f (2010) and
Gould, Moav, and Simhon (2008), who respectively assume that all females are identical, or
that the degree of inequality among males and females is always the same. By consequence,
our analysis is not restricted to the monogamy/polygyny dichotomy, and our model is able to
account for the emergence of serial monogamy inside an institutional setting which does not
rule out polygynous mating.
Finally, it is worth noticing that, although our model aims to explain the evolution of mar-
riage institutions over a fairly long time horizon, providing a justification for the emergence of
formalized marriage and family institutions is outside its scope. The interested reader might
like to look at Ghiglino, Francesconi, and Perry (2009) for some insight into the origins of the
family.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After this Introduction, Section 2 provides
an overview of the historical evolution of marriage institutions and reviews existing theories
of the emergence of monogamy and divorce. Section 3 presents the basic modeling choices
and analyzes the temporary equilibria on the marriage market, under the three alternative
marriage institutions. Section 4 is devoted to the choice among the three alternative marriage
institutions through solving the political economy model. Social mobility and dynamics are
introduced and analyzed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Changes in Marriage Institutions: Facts and Theories
In this Section we present an overview of the historical evolution of marriage institutions and
discuss existing theories of the transition from polygyny to monogamy, and from monogamy
to serial monogamy. It is important to underline that identifying the exact timing of these
transitions is not an easy task, and is subject to some debate. In most cases, the disagreement on
when – for instance – socially imposed monogamy replaced polygyny, has generated conflicting
theories about the mechanisms that might have driven such a transition.
2.1 Historical Timeline
It is not easy to establish exactly when the transition from polygyny to monogamy occurred,
and the very dichotomy opposing polygyny to monogamy is perhaps insufficient to capture
the complex evolution of marriage arrangements and mating practices (Scheidel 2009b). Three
alternative views trace monogamy back to (i) ancient Greece and Rome, (ii) the Middle Ages,
and (iii) the Industrial Revolution, respectively. Much of the debate concentrates on the fact
that, both in ancient Rome and in the Middle Ages, some men married monogamously but
mated polygynously.
It is in fact well known that, in ancient Rome, members of the aristocracy often fathered children
with their slaves. These children were brought up with, and in the style of, legitimate children,
freed young, and given wealth, position, and paternal affection (Betzig 1992).6 We would then
agree with Scheidel (2009a), who claims that the “Greeks and Romans established a paradigm
for subsequent periods that eventually attained global dominance. What can be observed is a
historical trajectory from polygamous to formally monogamous but effectively often polygynous
arrangements and on to more substantively and comprehensively monogamous conventions.
Greek and Roman societies occupy an intermediate and retrospectively speaking transitional
position on this spectrum. Shunning multiple marriage and discouraging informal parallel
cohabitation such as concubinage within marriage, their system readily accommodated multiple
sexual relations for married men (though not for women), most notably through sexual access
to slaves (of either sex)”. MacDonald (1995) reports that a steady deterioration in the status of
bastards occurred under the Christian Roman emperors, and continued as a result of Christian
6The Roman example is very controversial and interesting. Initially the ancient law of Rome reserved
the possibility of divorce only to men, and only conditional to serious marital faults, such as adultery and
infertility. Divorce on grounds of sterility appears to have been first allowed in 235 B.C. (Aulus Gellius, Attic
Nights 17.21.44). Later on, as Rome entered the classical age, the privilege of initiating divorce was extended
to wives. Eventually, divorce was heavily restricted by Constantine in 331 A.C. and by the Theodosian Code.
Therefore, de jure (serial) monogamy coexisted with de facto polygyny.
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influence during the early Middle Ages, when social controls on the possibility of illegitimate
children inheriting property became increasingly effective.7 In addition to direct ecclesiastical
influence, a variety of other penalties arising from the secular authorities and public opinion
applied to illegitimate birth, leading to an increased mortality of illegitimate children. Stone
(1977) highlights that by the thirteenth century the Church had managed to take control of
marriage law and get bastards legally excluded from property inheritance (bastards disappeared
from wills altogether during the Puritan era in England).
Therefore, if we restrict our attention to the Western World and link polygyny to the possibility
of fathering children from multiple women simultaneously, it seems safe to affirm that European
countries, which were inhabited by polygamous societies before the Greek-Roman age and
remained highly polygynous in the pre-Christian era and during the early days of Christianity,
had become strictly monogamous after the spread of Christianity. Figure 1 lists some important
landmarks for marriage institutions in Europe. After Saint Augustine, The Church fought a
long battle against illegitimate children, bigamy, and concubinage, culminating with the two
major Councils which defined the rules still prevailing today for the catholics: the fourth
Lateran Council in 1215 and the Council of Trent in 1563. As summarized by MacDonald
(1995), “there has been a remarkable continuity within a varied set of institutions that have
uniformly penalized polygyny and channeled non-monogamous sexuality into non-reproductive
outlets (or suppressed it altogether). Despite changes in these institutions, and despite vast
changes in political and economic structures, Western family institutions deriving ultimately
from Roman civilization have clearly sought and with considerable success to impose monogamy
on all classes of society.” And for some centuries, both polygyny and divorce were banned
almost everywhere in Europe.
However, Europe is nowadays almost completely serial-monogamous, with unilateral divorce
laws adopted almost everywhere and differences between men and women removed. After the
evolution from polygyny to monogamy, the Western World has thus completed, over the last
two centuries, a further transition from monogamy to serial monogamy, which is often regarded
as a salient feature of the “second demographic transition” popularized by Lesthaeghe and Neels
(2002) and Lesthaeghe and Neidert (2006). Unlike monogamy, it is relatively easy to establish
when serial monogamy was initiated (see Phillips 1988, 1991).
In this respect, Scotland was an isolated frontrunner, first recognizing divorce for adultery in
the 1560s (although MacDonald (1995) reports that there were only an average of 19 divorces
per year from 1836 to 1841). In England, by 1857 the Matrimonial Causes Act made divorce
7Henrich, Boyd, and Richerson (2012) identify the exclusion of illegitimate children from inheritance as the
key defining factor of monogamy.
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Figure 1: European Marriage Institutions: Timeline
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available to ordinary people through a Court of Law, and the fear that legalized divorce would
result in large-scale serial monogamy continued to inspire arguments over divorce up to the
20th century.8 Eventually, in 1923 women were allowed divorce on the same terms as men. In
France, divorce became legal in the aftermath of the revolution (1792), was banned again in
1816, and progressively reinstated starting from 1884.9 In Germany, an imperial divorce law was
passed as part of the 1875 Personal Status Act. In 1916, Sweden became the first Scandinavian
country with a liberal-for-that-time divorce law, and the other Scandinavian countries followed
with similar laws within a few years. In the aftermath of the 1917 Revolution, the Soviet
Union entered an era of very informal and easy divorce, but during Stalin’s regime, family law
was radically revised, and divorce became difficult and expensive to obtain. Eventually, a new
liberalization occurred after 1968. More recently, divorce has been introduced by referendums
in Italy (1974) and Ireland (1997), and reintroduced in Spain (1981). At the time these four
countries were introducing divorce, other European were making it even easier to obtain (no-
fault and unilateral divorce).10
Concerning the U.S., where marriage is subject to state laws, divorce was first legalized by
Maryland in 1701 and has become progressively more widespread and easier to obtain (the
introduction of no-fault and unilateral divorce by the States is detailed by Drewianka 2008).
2.2 Theories of the Emergence of Monogamy and Divorce
There are multiple theories about the emergence of monogamy, trying to explain why polygyny
has been replaced by monogamy. The problem was first studied by sociologists, anthropologists
and historians, who elaborated a variety of explanations. For instance, Alexander (1979) sees
monogamy as a choice made by the ruling elite, in order to ”regulate the reproductive striving
of individuals and sub-groups within societies, in the interest of preserving unity in the larger
group”. Very much in the same spirit, Betzig (1986) claims that wealthy, powerful males
adopted monogamy in order to elicit cooperation from others whose services were both essential
and irreplaceable. This explanation, based on the emergence of economic specialization and
the division of labor, points to the Industrial Revolution as the time when polygyny died out.11
8This fear was apparently groundless: according to Phillips (1988), in England the divorce rate remained
below 0.1/1000 until 1914, and below 1/1000 until 1943.
9Under the Vichy Regime, divorce was denied to couples married for less than three years.
10After the referendum held in Malta on 28th May 2011, only two countries remain were divorce is still illegal:
the Philippines and the Vatican.
11More generally, Betzig (1986) speculates that polygyny, being a typical feature of despotism, has been ruled
out by democracy, which in turns correlates with economic development and specialization.
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This kind of explanation, which goes under the name of male compromise theory, points to
male interests as the driving force in the transition to monogamy.
MacDonald (1995) proposes instead an evolutionary theory of socially imposed monogamy,
where mechanisms of social control (democracy, Church) also play a key role. In his theory,
“socially imposed monogamy” signifies that there are prohibitions on reproductive relation-
ships outside of what is defined as legitimate, monogamous marriage. Both Europe in the late
Middle ages, and the ancient Sparta, due to their social characteristics, could adopt monog-
amous marriage. In this framework, the interests (and the political participation) of women
and unskilled men might have played a key role in the social choice of monogamy. Henrich,
Boyd, and Richerson (2012) see the emergence of monogamous marriage as a result of inter-
group competition, since monogamy creates benefits at the societal level and reduces aggregate
societal costs, thereby giving an edge in inter-group competition. In particular, imposing
monogamous marriage reduces intra-sexual competition and enhances parental investment in
children, which is key to achieve success in competition between communities. Kanazawa and
Still (1999) also depart from the male compromise literature, suggesting that monogamy might
indeed have been a female choice: if resource inequality among men is small, women prefer to
marry monogamously. The only attempt to propose a comprehensive interpretation of polyg-
yny, monogamy and serial monogamy is due to Marlowe (2000). He claims that when males
provide all the income but some have much more than others, the richer males will achieve
polygyny. When males provide all the income but there is little variation, ecologically imposed
monogamy prevails because the polygyny threshold is not reached. Where there is almost no
male investment, females should gene shop and mate polygynously. When males provide an
intermediate level of investment with little variation, females are only moderately dependent
on males and the result is serial monogamy and slight polygyny.
Economists have formalized three different theories of the emergence of monogamy. Consistent
with the classical Beckerian view, according to which male inequality in wealth naturally pro-
duces inequality in the number of their wives (see also Grossbard-Shechtman 1980), Lagerlo¨f
(2005) explains the decline in polygyny by a decrease in male inequality, reproducing in this
respect the mechanism proposed by Kanazawa and Still (1999). Starting from the observation
that monogamy also characterizes highly unequal societies, Gould, Moav, and Simhon (2008)
suggest an alternative explanation: monogamy emerged as a consequence of a rise in the value
of quality, rather than quantity, of children. If the mother’s human capital affects the human
capital of her children, and men value children’s quality, they may prefer one wife of high
quality (high human capital) over several wives of low quality. This theory is compatible with
the view that, in the Western World, the switch to an industrial economy marked the passage
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from polygyny to monogamy. Finally, Lagerlo¨f (2010) explains the rise of “socially imposed”
monogamy through the male compromise theory, seeing monogamy as a choice made by the
ruling elite in order to avoid the threat of rebellion by lower-status men. This kind of model
is compatible with monogamy arising in the Middle Ages, well before the establishment of
democracy.
But why did Western societies shift from polygyny to monogamy, without considering the
option of serial monogamy? In fact, serial monogamy may be seen as a kind of intermediate
passage, since it allows multiple mating (over a lifetime), but prevents the richest men from
monopolizing the reproductive life of multiple women at the same time. As highlighted by Ka¨a¨r
et al. (1998), serial monogamy seems to have been an important male reproductive strategy
in historical populations: through remarriage, men can potentially extend their reproductive
lifespan above that of their spouses. So, why did the system that we have in modern societies
today – serial monogamy involving a high marital break-up rate – come after monogamy, instead
of deriving directly from polygyny? Existing theories of divorce and remarriage – from Becker,
Landes, and Michael (1977) to Chiappori and Weiss (2006), and Barham, Devlin, and Yang
(2009) – are quite silent on this point, and a theory of the emergence of divorce laws is still
lacking.
2.3 Coalitions and Marriage Institutions
The formation of coalitions involving different groups of males and females has been of crucial
importance in defining marriage institutions in preindustrial societies, even in the absence of
formal political structures. In this respect, Low (1992) emphasizes that “in some societies
politics and reproduction are overtly interwoven” and “the line between ’coalitions’ and ’poli-
tics’ is not always clear”. Moreover, according to MacDonald (1995)’s analysis of the medieval
“socially imposed monogamy”, there is evidence of three trends: (i) political activity of lower
status males; (ii) political activity of females and their relatives; (iii) the emergence of the
Church as a powerful collectivist institution trying to impose monogamy on the ruling secular
elite. In fact, historians agree that socially imposed monogamy in Western Europe originated
as a result of conflict in which the ecclesiastical authorities attempted to combat the power of
the aristocracy, and a major aspect of the power of the Church over the secular aristocracy
involved the regulation of reproductive behavior.
Moreover, there is evidence confirming that women have at times directly supported institutions
favorable to monogamy in Western Europe, and this influence may also have occurred during
antiquity. According to Brown (1988), female support may have been a crucial factor in the
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emergence and success of the early Christian Church, which featured monogamy, chastity,
and sexual decorum as prominent aspects of its public image (see also MacDonald 1990).
Henrich, Boyd, and Richerson (2012) underline that European aristocracies, which derived
from clan-based tribal societies, were highly polygynous in the 5th century and, as monogamy
was gradually being imposed, the main line of resistance came from the nobility, while lower
classes, who were economically limited to monogamous marriage anyway, were rapidly adopting
Christianity. The idea that the political interests of women and poor men might have been
represented by the Church is further confirmed by Stone (1990), who stresses that parishes
were responsible for taxing the wealthiest third of the population to support the indigent. He
also suggests that, after the decline of ecclesiastical control in England, women – fearing that
divorce would result in desertion and economic loss – acted as an interest group favoring the
maintenance of anti-divorce customs.12 Stone sees a role for male interests in controlling the
reproductive behavior of both females and other males: as mentioned above, in England the
fear that legalizing divorce would result in large-scale serial monogamy by promiscuous (and
richer) males did not disappear from the public debate until the nineteenth century.
3 The Model
We now introduce our unifying approach to marriage institutions. In this section, we detail
our model, and describe the equilibrium configurations of the marriage market under polygyny,
monogamy and serial monogamy at a given time t (denoted by P, M and S, respectively).
3.1 Modeling Choices
Time is discrete. Every individual lives two periods: childhood and adulthood, which is in turn
made of two subperiods. This last assumption allows us to deal with divorce and remarriage.
There are two genders, males and females, and two income levels, rich and poor. Income should
be seen as life-cycle income and covers three broad classes of wealth: (i) physical (strength,
practical skills), (ii) material (land, livestock, household goods, and - at later stages of devel-
opment - physical capital), (iii) human (social ties in networks, ritual knowledge, and later on,
education and intellectual skills). The degree to which these types of wealth can be passed
from one generation to the next varies: it is high for material wealth, and much more limited
12However, Stone (1990) also points out that working-class wives, although opposed to divorce, presumably
had little or no influence on the political process.
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for physical endowments. Still, Borgerhoff Mulder et al. (2009) show that the degree of inter-
generational transmission of all classes of wealth is positive in 21 historical and contemporary
populations. This will be important when we consider the dynamics of the income distribution.
Poor people can be seen as having some physical wealth but little material and human wealth.
Rich people have either high material wealth, or high human capital, or both.
We assume that the income of rich individuals is equal to one, for both males and females. Giv-
ing rich males and females the same income is done for simplification and has no consequences
for the results, as long as skilled females are rich enough. As physical strength may be more
important for the poor’s productivity, we assume that the poor male’s income is ω < 1 and
poor female’s income is ρ < ω.13 Time spent rearing children does not affect life-cycle income.
The state of the economy is described by the proportion of rich in the two genders, denoted µt
for males and φt for females. A rise in these proportions reflects a rise in material and human
wealth and a relative decline in embodied wealth.
In each subperiod, a female can be married or not. If she is married, she gives birth to one
child. This implies that if all women are married for both subperiods, every woman has two
children, and the population is constant. In each subperiod, males can be married or not, to
one or two females.
Definition 1 (Marriage)
A marriage is a relationship between persons of different sexes, which:
• partners freely choose to join;
• involves one and only one male;
• implies that resources are pooled and shared equally among the members of the household;
• allows every female to have one child per subperiod.
Utility depends on life-time consumption c and marriage relationships in each period. It is
separable in its two arguments. The utility derived from life-time consumption is v(c), where
v() is increasing and concave, and consumption exhausts the resources pooled by the partners
(no saving is possible). Divorce allows partners to remarry in the following period, but entrains
a monetary cost d that must be subtracted from the resources of both partners.
13Our results also hold for the limit case ρ = ω. However, Olivetti and Petrongolo (2011) report that the
gender gap in income is wider at lower levels of education.
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In each period, the utility from relationships depends on the number, exclusiveness, and quality
of simultaneous marriage relationship in which the individual is involved. The number of
relationships can be 0 (single), 1 (monogamy) or 2 (polygyny). The utility from relationships is
also increasing and concave in the number of relationships, for a given quality of the relationship,
which can be g > 0 in the case of a happy (good) relationship, or b < g if the relationship
deteriorates and becomes unhappy (bad). This second case can only happen after one period,
with probability p. If the relationship is not exclusive, i.e. if there are other persons of the same
sex involved in the marriage, there is a jealousy cost m to be accounted for. In our framework,
the jealousy cost m only applies to women involved in a polygynous relationship.
Total utility is the sum of utility from life-time consumption plus the utility from relationships
in the two periods. For example, the expected utility of a lasting monogamous marriage is:
v(c) + g + (1− p)g + pb. (1)
To simplify notation, we define the expected relationship utility of a lasting monogamous
marriage as:
up = g + (1− p)g + pb = (2− p)g + pb. (2)
If one man has two wives to whom he remains married for both periods, his relationship utility
becomes (1 + z)up, with 0 < z < 1 so as to account for the decreasing marginal utility of
simultaneous relationships. Finally, we assume that the relationship utility of singles is zero.
3.2 Temporary Equilibrium
We first define and analyze the equilibrium at time t. Our analysis is valid under Assumption 1.
Assumption 1 At time t, the proportion of rich males is larger that the proportion of rich
females, i.e. µt > φt.
This assumption seems highly realistic, at least until the very recent past. We now provide a
definition of the equilibrium in the marriage market, which is valid for all the three marriage
institutions we are going to consider.
Definition 2 (Temporary Equilibrium)
A temporary equilibrium in the marriage market is such that no individual prefers to be single
and no pair of two individuals of opposite sex prefers to marry each other than to keep their
current assignment.
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This definition, which is consistent with the “stable marriage assignment” property (Gale
and Shapley 1962), follows Bergstrom and Bagnoli (1993) and Mortensen (1988), who give a
description of the matching process which lies behind such an equilibrium: “Each person on
one side of the market – the men, say – makes an offer to his favorite individual on the other
side, a woman, who either rejects the offer in favor of one already received (which includes the
“offer” of remaining single) or tentatively accepts it by rejecting any previously accepted one.
Each rejected man then makes an offer to his next most preferred woman, and the process
continues until each man either has been accepted by some woman or has been rejected by
every woman whom he prefers to bachelorhood.”
Although similar definitions are used in the context of monogamy, this one extends to polyg-
ynous marriages: for an assignment to be an equilibrium we require that no woman could
increase her utility by being accepted in a marriage (be it polygynous or monogamous) other
than her own.
In the literature on marriage, it is usually assumed that nobody remains single in equilibrium.14
We impose the corresponding assumptions here, in order to rule out voluntary singleness.15 Let
us first rule out singleness as an alternative option to lasting marriages. In the case of lifetime
monogamous marriages, rich males prefer to marry a poor female to staying single if
up > v(2)− v (1 + ρ) . (3)
If the above condition holds, a rich male would agree to marry a poor female: by doing so,
he would trade a relationship utility gain up against an individual consumption utility loss
v(2)− v(1 + ρ). This would hold in particular if the utility gain from a relationship that has
turned bad is still large (for example, if it is very important to have children).
Although rich males agree to marry poor females, this is not necessarily the case for poor males,
as the income loss implied by marriage may heavily affect their utility, if v() is concave enough.
Therefore, we must also impose the condition that:
up > v(2ω)− v (ω + ρ) . (4)
If both rich and poor males always prefer a lifetime monogamous marriage to staying single
(Inequalities (3) and (4)), this is a fortiori true for females. In fact, poor females always gain
14A notable exception is Saint-Paul (2009), whose model interprets the emergence of widespread singleness
as a by-product of increasing inequality.
15With polygyny, there will inevitably be some single males. However they do not choose this status volun-
tarily.
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from income pooling, which makes Inequality (4) sufficient to exclude the possibility that they
would choose to remain single. Singleness for rich females is ruled out if up > v(2)− v (1 + ω),
which is implied by Inequality (3) since ω > ρ.
Since male utility is increasing in the number of relationships, Inequalities 3 and 4 are also
sufficient to rule out male singleness under polygyny, For women, we need to impose a condition
on the jealousy cost m. The worst-case marriage for a rich female would be a polygynous
marriage, in which she shares a poor husband with a poor female. As we will see later,
such a configuration cannot arise in equilibrium: rich females always have a rich husband,
possibly shared with another rich female. The condition for a rich female to prefer a marriage
arrangement of this kind to remaining single is:
up > m. (5)
Equation (5) also implies that poor females will never choose to remain single as they always
benefit from some income pooling (unlike rich females) in addition to the utility gain from a
relationship.
Consider now the possibility of divorce. In general, this makes singleness less attractive, because
divorce allows individuals to replace an unhappy marriage with a new happy one. However,
divorce also opens the possibility of strategic singleness, when some agent receiving an offer
from a poor partner in the first subperiod may have an interest in waiting for a match with a
wealthier (e.g divorced rich) person. Such a strategy would allow him to avoid paying the cost
of divorce. For a rich male to prefer marrying a poor female to being single for one subperiod,
and marrying a rich wife (which is the best possible case) we need:
up + v(1 + ρ) > g + v(2). (6)
Equation (6) can be rewritten as (1− p)g + pb > v(2)− v (1 + ρ) and implies Equation (3).
For both poor males and rich females, the equilibrium configuration will be such that they do
not have any better match to wait for. Hence, it remains to consider poor females, who could
hope to find a rich male in the second subperiod. For a poor female to prefer marrying a poor
male to being single for one subperiod, and then marrying a rich husband (which is the best
possible case) we need
up + v(ω + ρ) > g + v
(
3ρ+ 1
2
)
. (7)
Gathering all the requirements imposed by Equations (3) to (7), we establish a condition on
the utility of an unhappy marriage b:
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Assumption 2 Preferences and productivity satisfy:
g > b >
1
p
max
[
v(2ω)− v (ω + ρ)− (2− p)g, m− (2− p)g, v(2)− v(1 + ρ)− (1− p)g,
v
(
3ρ+ 1
2
)
− v(ω + ρ)− (1− p)g
]
. (8)
We now consider the three possible institutions in turn, starting with polygyny.
3.3 Polygyny
For simplicity, in our characterization of polygyny we constrain the maximum number of wives
per husband to two, i.e. we focus on bigyny. Serial monogamy as modeled below (i.e. with two
subperiods) can therefore be regarded as the inter-temporal version of bigamy.
Definition 3 (Polygyny)
Polygyny is a constitution according to which marriages satisfy the following additional char-
acteristics:
• each male is allowed to marry up to two females at the same time;
• partners remain together for the two subperiods.
As it is clear from this definition, we do not allow for the possibility of divorce.16 From the
point of view of men, a polygynous marriage is equivalent to multiple monogamous marriages.
In particular, marrying bigamously allows a man to father four children, instead of the two he
could raise inside a monogamous marriage.
For polygyny to be a stable equilibrium, the jealousy cost must be low enough not to deter
females from joining harems headed by rich males. Hence, we shall assume that
16Whenever the possibility of divorce exists in polygynous societies, its characteristics are far from those
observed in nowadays serial monogamous societies. In Islam, for example, divorce is very asymmetric, as
a husband may repudiate his wife without giving any reason, while the inverse is not true. Moreover, the
father alone remains in charge of the financial support of the children, who are under his exclusive custody after
reaching a certain age. In Ancient Rome, that we consider as de facto polygynous, divorce was also asymmetric,
children were regarded as the property of the father, and there was no such thing as joint marital property.
Hence, in both these cases, divorce only gives more flexibility to polygyny from the male viewpoint, while it is
not an easily accessible option for females. Writing a theory of the different forms divorce can take goes beyond
the scope of this paper.
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Figure 2: Polygyny: Equilibrium with µt < 1/2
Assumption 3 The jealousy cost m satisfies
m < v(2)− v (1 + ω) , (9)
and
m < v
(
2 + 4ρ
3
)
− v (ω + ρ) . (10)
The first condition requires rich females to prefer a polygynous marriage with a rich male to
a monogamous marriage with a poor male. The second condition is such that poor females
prefer to live in a harem headed by a rich male than to form a poor couple.17
17Westermarck (1925), vol V, p.86-89, provides many examples of jealousy between co-wives and its limit.
For example, among the Kru people (gulf of Guinea) “a woman would infinitely prefer to be one of a dozen
wives of a respectable man, than to be the sole representative of a man who had no force of character to raise
himself above the one-woman level.”
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We also require men to like polygyny enough, so that they prefer two poor wives to one
rich one.18 In other terms, the utility value of an additional relationship is large enough to
compensate for the monetary loss attached to having a harem with poor females.
Assumption 4 Preferences and productivity satisfy:
zup > v(2)− v
(
2 + 4ρ
3
)
(11)
A priori three types of harems are possible: mixed harems composed of one rich and one poor
wife, and homogeneous harems composed exclusively of either low- or high-status females.
However, it is possible to show that only homogeneous harems are formed at equilibrium.
Lemma 1 There is no harem including both rich and poor females.
Proof. Let us prove the lemma by a reductio ad absurdum. Suppose there are (at least two)
mixed harems. Then, the husband has an incentive to replace his poor wife by a rich one. His
rich wife would also benefit from such a replacement, since she would enjoy a more favorable
resource pooling. Any other rich female involved in a similar mixed harem would be ready to
serve as replacement. It is then possible to find a pair of individuals of opposite sexes who
would prefer to marry each other than to stay in their current assignment, which would violate
Definition 2. This means that, under polygyny, there might be at most one mixed harem, which
is of measure zero in our continuous setting.
Moreover, we can claim the following:
Lemma 2 Only rich males may have harems.
Proof. This lemma can also be proved by a reductio ad absurdum. Consider first harems with
rich females. Suppose that one poor male has such a harem. By Assumption 1, it implies that
there is a rich male who is either single or married with poor wives. Both this man and the
two wives of the harem would improve their utility by forming a rich harem.
Second, let us consider harems with poor females. Suppose that one poor male has such a
harem. This implies that there will be at least one single male in the economy. Regardless
18For Westermarck (1925), vol. V, p. 74, “A further cause of polygyny is man’s taste for variety. The sexual
instinct is dulled by long familiarity and stimulated by novelty.”
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of the skill of this single, marrying him would always increase the utility of a member of the
harem. This is true even if the jealousy cost is zero as
v
(
2ω + 4ρ
3
)
< v (ω + ρ) (12)
Hence, the current assignment would be dominated by another one and would not satisfy
Definition 2.
There are two possible equilibrium configurations, depending on the share of rich males in the
population. If µt > 1/2, it is not possible for every rich male to marry polygynously. This
implies that there exists at least one rich female who can find a rich male who would be happy
to take her as his (only) wife. In any case, richer males are far more likely to be polygynous,
a result derived by Grossbard-Shechtman (1980), among others, and empirically validated by
Grossbard-Shechtman (1986).
Proposition 1 Suppose polygyny is the constitution and that Assumptions 1 to 4 hold.
If µt <
1
2
, we have in equilibrium:
• φt
2
rich harems, µt − φt
2
poor harems, 1− 2µt poor couples, µt poor single males.
If
1
2
≤ µt < 1 + φt
2
, we have in equilibrium
• 1− 2µt + φt
2
rich harems, 2µt − 1 rich couples, 1− φt
2
poor harems, 1 − µt poor single
males.
If µt ≥ 1 + φt
2
, we have in equilibrium
• φt rich couples, 1 − µt poor harems, 2µt − 1 − φt rich/poor couples, 1 − µt poor single
males.
Proof. Let us consider the three possible cases, one at a time. Recall that, at equilibrium, no
two persons of opposite sex should have an incentive to break their marriages to form a new
one together.
Suppose that µt < 1/2: in such a case, every rich man can potentially head a harem. If this is
the case, mixed harems – involving one rich and one poor wife – cannot arise in equilibrium,
since a rich women who is part of a mixed harem would have an incentive to replace a poor
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wife of another mixed harem (to form a homogeneous harem), and the husband and the other
rich wife would agree to accept her in the marriage (Lemma 1). Moreover, no rich female (and
a fortiori, no poor woman) can convince a rich man to form a monogamous marriage, since
by Assumption 4 rich men prefer two poor wives to one rich wife, and their relative scarcity
(µt < 1/2) allows them to get two wives. Assumption 3 further ensures that all rich men will
have harems, since both classes of women prefer to be the second wife of a rich man to marrying
a poor man monogamously. The remaining 1−2µt poor women (who are not part of the harem
of a rich men) can have access to a monogamous marriage with a poor husband. Residually,
there must be µt poor single males at equilibrium.
Suppose instead that 1/2 ≤ µt < (1 + φt)/2: in such a case, although rich men will monop-
olize all available women, not every rich man can have access to a polygynous marriage. In
consequence, and in contrast with the previous case, some rich women will manage to obtain a
monogamous marriage. In particular, if the second condition of Assumption 3 holds, all poor
women will be available to marry a rich husband polygamously. Given Lemma 1, this means
that at equilibrium (1 − φt)/2 poor harems will be formed. The remaining rich men can form
either rich harems or rich couples ((1−2µt+φt)/2 and 2µt−1, respectively). Given Assumption
4 and Lemma 1, this equilibrium configuration is Gale-Shapley stable.
Finally, if µt ≥ (1 + φt)/2, rich men are still numerous enough to monopolize all women,
but the relative scarcity of rich females allows all these women to marry monogamously. In
consequence, we will have φt rich couples. The remaining µt − φt rich men are now less than
half of the population of poor females. This implies that some of these women (2µt − 1 − φt)
will end up being the only wife of a rich husband, while the remaining 2(1−µt) will form poor
harems. As in the previous case, there are µt poor single males at equilibrium.
Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the equilibrium in the case µt < 1/2. The bars
represent, for each of the two genders, the distribution of agents by income group, whose utility
is also reported.
The actual incidence of polygyny is variable. Suppose for instance that the share of rich males
µt increases. For values of µt < 1/2, a rise in µt leads to more harems and fewer single
males. The number of harems is thus maximized at µt = 1/2 but, as µt increases above
1/2, the number of rich harems diminishes and some of them are “transformed” into rich
couples.19 For µt = (1 + φt)/2, all the rich harems have disappeared. As µt increases further,
the poor harems are progressively transmuted into rich/poor couples. Notice that the intensity
of polygyny depends only on µt and φt, and not on individual preferences and productivity
(unlike Propositions 4 to 6 in Grossbard-Shechtman 1980).
19Grossbard (1976) also found that more educated women have fewer co-wives.
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In order to characterize the political equilibrium, we need to determine the expected utility of
the four groups, for any possible marriage regime. To this purpose, we denote ex ante utilities
as W kij where k = M,P, S is the marriage institution (monogamy, polygyny, serial monogamy),
i = r, p is the income level and j = m, f is the gender. Ex ante utilities under polygyny (W Pij )
are given in Appendix A.
3.4 Monogamy
We now turn to monogamy, which in our framework of analysis is defined as:
Definition 4 (Monogamy)
Monogamy is a constitution according to which marriages, in addition to those listed in Defi-
nition 1, satisfy the following characteristics:
(a) each person is allowed to marry at most one person of the opposite sex;
(b) partners remain together for the two subperiods.
Proposition 2 describes the equilibrium marriage pattern which emerges under monogamy.
Proposition 2 Assume that monogamy is the constitution at time t, and that Assumptions 1
and 2 hold. Then, we have in equilibrium:
(i) φt marriages between rich persons,
(ii) 1− µt marriages between poor persons,
(iii) (µt − φt) marriages between rich males and poor females.
Proof. Rich men always agree to marry rich females and vice versa, as v(2) + up > v(2)
is implied by Condition (3). Since by Assumption (1) there are more rich males than rich
females, a marriage pattern involving marriages between rich females and poor males is not an
equilibrium. In fact, rich females would always gain from making a proposal to a rich male,
who would of course accept it. Therefore (i) holds.
Poor females always accept any marriage proposal as a consequence of Condition (4).
By Condition (3), rich males accept the marriage propositions of poor females. Therefore (iii)
holds.
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Figure 3: Monogamy: Equilibrium
By Condition (4), poor males always agree to marry poor females and vice versa so that (ii)
holds.
The equilibrium is represented in Figure 3. The associated ex ante levels of utility, for each
of the four groups involved in the marriage game, are given in Appendix B. Since everybody
expects the same up, utility differentials across groups derive from the consumption possibilities
associated with different outcomes on the marriage market. In this framework, the utility of
two groups, rich females and poor males, is certain, while the utility of poor females and rich
males is subject to uncertainty, and depends on the state of the economy (µt, φt).
3.5 Serial Monogamy
The third possible matrimonial institution that we must characterize is serial monogamy.
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Definition 5 (Serial Monogamy)
Serial monogamy is a constitution according to which marriages, in addition to those listed in
Definition 1, satisfy the following characteristics:
(a) each person is allowed to marry at most one partner of the opposite sex for every subperiod;
(b) a marriage can end in divorce at the end of the first subperiod if one of the spouses so
wishes (unilateral divorce);
(c) for divorced agents, it is possible to marry a new partner at the beginning of the second
subperiod.
Potentially, a wide array of marriage outcomes can arise at equilibrium. In order to reduce the
number of possible cases, we shall assume that the divorce cost d is such that unhappy poor
women never divorce but unhappy rich women always divorce.
Assumption 5 The divorce cost d satisfies
v(ω + ρ) + g + b > v
(
ω + 1 + 2ρ
2
− d
)
+ 2g, (13)
and
v(2) + g + b < v(2− d) + 2g. (14)
This assumption will imply that the rich divorce more often than the poor. It is well documented
that the rich are more in favor of divorce than the poor at the time of its introduction. In
particular, that serial monogamy might be a “bourgeois” institution seems to be confirmed by
the results of the referendums on divorce held in Ireland and Italy: in both cases high-income,
educated and urban voters voted in favor of divorce more than low-income, less educated and
rural ones (see Marradi (1976) for Italy, and Darcy and Laver (1990) for Ireland). In today’s
U.S. the incidence of divorce is higher among low-income families, but such a negative, empirical
relationship between divorce and income is blurred by the fact that divorce rates are negatively
related to education (see Stevenson and Wolfers 2007), because, for instance, educated people
make more informed choices.
We can thus claim the following.
Proposition 3 Assume that serial monogamy is the constitution at time t and that Assump-
tions 1, 2 and 5 hold. We have in equilibrium:
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(i) (1− p)φt lasting marriages between rich persons,
(ii) pφt marriages between rich persons ending in divorce by mutual consent,
(iii) pφt remarriages between rich persons,
(iv) 1− µt lasting marriages between poor persons.
Moreover let us denote
νt =
φt
µt
v
(
3 + ρ
2
− d
)
+
µt − φt
µt
v(1 + ρ− d) + g − b
νt =
pφt
pφt + µt − φtv
(
3 + ρ
2
− d
)
+
µt − φt
pφt + µt − φtv(1 + ρ− d).
(a) If v(1 + ρ) > νt, then we have
(v) µt − φt lasting marriages between rich males and poor females.
(b) If νt < v(1 + ρ) < νt, then we have
(v’) p(µt − φt) marriages between rich males and poor females ending in divorce,
(vi’) p(µt − φt) remarriages between rich males and poor females,
(vii’) (1− p)(µt − φt) lasting marriages between rich males and poor females.
(c) If v(1 + ρ) < νt, then we have
(v”) µt − φt marriages between rich males and poor females ending in divorce,
(vi”) µt − φt remarriages between rich males and poor females.
Proof. Thanks to Conditions (6) and (7), nobody wants to remain single. In particular, with
only poor females left on the marriage market, rich males do not prefer to wait and remain
single.
Following the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 2, serial monogamy coincides with
monogamy for the first subperiod.
The first condition of Assumption 5 implies that it is always worthwhile for rich females married
to rich males to pay the cost of divorce d if their marriage is unhappy. On the contrary, if their
marriage is happy, they have no gain from divorce. All this is a fortiori true for their rich
husbands, who face the additional risk of marrying down in the second subperiod. Hence, (i),
(ii) and (iii) hold.
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Figure 4: Serial Monogamy: Equilibrium when (b) Holds
The second condition in Assumption 5 implies that even if divorce is available, it is too costly
for poor women to be optimal, even if they are unhappy and they are certain to marry a rich
male in the second subperiod. If this is true for females, it is a fortiori true for poor males who
have no hope of finding a rich partner after divorce. Hence, no marriage between poor persons
will end up in divorce, and (iv) holds.
As for the marriages between rich males and poor females, there are three possibilities. We are
sure that the wives would never want to divorce, but their husbands face different incentives
depending on the state of the economy (µt, φt). In case (a), rich males do not divorce even if
their marriage is unhappy, as the probability of remarrying up is not high enough to compensate
for the cost of divorce. (v) holds in that case. In case (b), the cost of divorce is sufficiently low
to justify the break up of an unhappy marriage, but high enough to prevent rich males from
interrupting a happy marriage in quest of a richer partner. On the other hand, under case (c),
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rich males always divorce from a poor partner.
Before computing ex ante utilities, we shall introduce a social cost of divorce into our model.
This cost s concerns everyone in the society, regardless of his/her marital status (married,
divorced, or single). In this respect, s is different from d, the individual, fixed cost of divorce,
which is paid only by divorcees. The existence of economy-wide costs of divorce is supported by
several studies (see for instance Schramm (2006) for a quantitative assessment), which identify
the cost of legal procedures and courts, the welfare state transfers to children of divorced
parents, the productivity loss of divorced workers, etc. as the main components of the social
burden imposed by divorce. As far as our model is concerned, the fact that s applies to the
whole society implies that all the conditions needed to rule out singleness hold unchanged.
The equilibrium in case (b) is represented in Figure 4. Ex ante utilities are given in Appendix C.
Once again, the indirect, expected utility of poor males and rich females does not depend on
the state of the economy. On the contrary, for the two other groups, expected utility is a
function of (µt, φt), through the probabilities of finding a match of a given type, in a fashion
which in turn depends on which case ((a), (b) or (c)) arises in equilibrium. It can be shown
that the expected utilities are all continuous in (µt, φt) over (0, 1)× (0, 1).
4 Political Equilibrium
At every t the marriage regime (polygyny, monogamy or serial monogamy) is chosen by majority
voting. We assume for the moment that all adults, regardless of their gender and status,
participate in the elections and their vote has an identical weight. This assumption might
eventually be removed to allow for a more realistic analysis in which either the rich, or males,
have a larger weight in the political process. Such a modification of the benchmark majority-
voting setup is not uncommon (see for instance Bourguignon and Verdier 2000).
4.1 Political Preferences by Group
Before delving into the analysis of the political equilibrium, it is useful to establish a few
preliminary results, which will help us to identify the political preferences of the four groups
of voters. Recall that we denote ex ante utilities as W kij where k = M,P, S is the marriage
institution (monogamy, polygyny, serial monogamy), i = r, p is the income level and j = m, f
is the gender.
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From the analysis of the three marriage institutions developed in the previous Section, it follows
that:
Lemma 3 When (µt, φt) → (0, 0), W Ppf → WMpf , W Ppm → WMpm. When (µt, φt) → (1, 1),
W Prf →WMrf , W Prm →WMrm. In both cases, polygyny tends to coincide with monogamy.
Proof. Consider first (µt, φt) → (0, 0), i.e. a situation in which everybody is poor. In
such a case polygyny coincides with monogamy, since limµt→0,φt→0W
P
pf = limµt→0,φt→0W
M
pf =
limµt→0,φt→0W
P
pm = limµt→0,φt→0W
M
pm = up + v(ω + ρ). If instead everybody becomes rich (so
that (µt, φt)→ (1, 1)), we have that limµt→1,φt→1W Prf = limµt→1,φt→1WMrf = limµt→1,φt→1W Prm =
limµt→1,φt→1W
M
rm = up + v(2).
The above Lemma says that, if there is absolute equality among both males and females,
everybody marries monogamously even if polygyny is not banned by law.
Moreover,
Lemma 4 Poor males prefer strict monogamy to the two other regimes for any state of the
economy. There also exists a threshold value for µt
µ¯ =
s
v(ω + ρ) + up − v(2ω)
such that poor males prefer polygyny to serial monogamy if and only if µt < µ¯.
Proof. This result follows from the comparison of expected utilities W Ppm, W
M
pm and W
S
pm.
Lemma 5 Rich females prefer monogamy to polygyny, unless µt > (1 + φt)/2 (polygyny coin-
cides with monogamy), in which case they are indifferent between polygyny and monogamy.
There is a threshold pˆ such that rich women prefer serial monogamy to monogamy for any state
of the economy if and only if p > pˆ, with
pˆ =
s
v(2− d)− v(2) + (g − b) > 0. (15)
Proof. This result follows from the comparison of expected utilities W Prf , W
M
rf and W
S
rf .
Assumption 5 ensures that pˆ > 0.
The very existence of a jealousy cost implies that rich females prefer monogamy to polygyny.
The second part of Lemma 5 tells us that, from the viewpoint of rich females, divorce become
an attractive option (when compared to monogamy) if the probability of their marriage going
bad is relatively high.
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Lemma 6 (A) Rich males always prefer polygyny to monogamy. Moreover, there exist a
threshold p˜(µt, φt) such that: (B) rich males prefer serial monogamy to monogamy for any
state of the economy if and only if p > p˜(µt, φt); (C) rich males prefer serial monogamy to
polygyny if and only if p > p˜(1, 1) and µt is large enough.
Proof. See Appendix D.
The rationale for this result is the following. If the possibility of having an unhappy marriage
is not too close to zero, rich men’s least preferred arrangement is monogamy, since it limits
their ability to take advantage of their higher status (which can allow them to have multiple
wives, simultaneously or over time).20 It is also straightforward that rich men prefer polygyny
to serial monogamy, as long as their relative scarcity ensures them a strong position on the
marriage market.
Concerning the choice between polygyny and monogamy, our model generates the straight
implication that rich and poor men have conflicting preferences. Interestingly enough, Anderson
and Tollison (1998) claim that the opposition of a majority of (lower- and middle-class) men,
who would have incurred some welfare loss under polygyny, played a key role in the U.S.
Congress decision to ban Mormon polygamy in 1882. Moreover, these same authors explain
that women might have benefited from polygyny, and in fact the Mormons actively supported
the enfranchisement of women.
Given these preference orderings, we can characterize the political equilibrium. For ease of
presentation, we consider separately two different cases, corresponding to φt + µt < 1 and
φt + µt > 1.
4.2 Aggregating Individual Preferences: the Poor are the Majority
(φt + µt < 1)
If the poor are the majority, the following Proposition completely describes the political equi-
librium.
20Schoellman and Tertilt (2006) quantify the cost born by males if monogamy is enforced in a polygynous
society and find it to be large, typically larger than the gain accruing to females.
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Proposition 4 If φt + µt < 1, there exist
µˆ(φt) = min
[
φtv(1 + ρ)− v(ω + ρ) + (1− φt)
(
v
(
2+4ρ
3
)−m)
v(1 + ρ)− v(ω + ρ) ,
φt
(
m+ v(1 + ρ)− v (2+4ρ
3
))
2m+ v(1 + ρ) + v(ω + ρ)− 2v (2+4ρ
3
)
]
, (16)
and
µ˜(φt) = φt +
(1− φt)s
p ((g − b)− (v(1 + ρ)− v(1 + ρ− d))) , (17)
such that the equilibrium regime is:
• polygyny, if 0 < µt < µˆ(φt),
• monogamy, if µˆ(φt) < µt < µ˜(φt),
• serial monogamy if µ˜(φt) < µt < 1− φt.
Proof. Since, by Assumption 1, µt > φt, below the diagonal (µt + φt < 1) poor females
are the largest group. They can always find another group that will have the same preferred
regime (given Lemmas 4, 5 and 6), and form a majority with them. Therefore, knowing the
preferences of this group is sufficient to characterize the political equilibrium. Consider the
preferences of poor females, for a given φt. Comparing W
P
pf , W
M
pf and W
S
pf , it can be shown
that for µt < µˆ(φt), poor females prefer polygyny; if µˆ(φt) < µt < µ˜(φt), poor females prefer
monogamy; if µ˜(φt) < µt, poor females prefer serial monogamy.
The situation is depicted in Figure 5. Notice that, for φt = 0, µˆ(0) = 0; while for φt = 1,
µˆ(1) = 1. Moreover, the two parts of the minimum are equal for µt = 1/2. If the value of φt
solving µˆ(φt) = 1/2 is less than 1/2, µˆ lies below the diagonal, and polygyny is an outcome
when we are close to the diagonal. That would establish the kinked line µˆ in Figure 5, and
be enough to prove that there is a transition from polygyny to monogamy as µt increases. For
µ˜(φt), three cases are possible. If condition (a) of Proposition 3 holds, poor females always
prefer monogamy to serial monogamy: WMpf (µt, φt) > W
S
pf(µt, φt). If (b) holds, we have:
µ˜(φt) = φt +
(1− φt)s
p ((g − b)− (v(1 + ρ)− v(1 + ρ− d))) . (18)
If instead (c) holds, we obtain:
µ˜(φt) = φt +
(1− φt)s
p(g − b)− (v(1 + ρ)− v(1 + ρ− d)) . (19)
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Figure 5: Political Equilibria when the Poor are the Majority
A priori, we cannot be sure that µˆ < µ˜ for all values of φt < 1 − µt, even if we restrict our
attention to case (b). However, we can determine conditions such that: 0 < µˆ(φt) < µ˜(φt) < 1.
To do this, consider that for any φt, Assumption 3 on the jealousy cost ensures that φt < µˆ.
Moreover, µˆ < µ˜ < 1 if the following condition on (g − b) holds:
v(1+ρ)−v(1+ρ−d)+ s
p
< (g−b) < v(1+ρ)−v(1+ρ−d)+ s
p
(
1 +
m+ v(1 + ρ)− v (2+4ρ
3
)
v
(
2+4ρ
3
)−m− v(ω + ρ)
)
.
(20)
In particular, the first inequality implies that µ˜(φt) < 1, while the second one ensures that
µˆ(φt) < µ˜(φt). Therefore, if the condition in (19) is verified, we can have a transition going
through the three regimes by increasing the number of rich males, given a constant low number
of rich females.
The intuition behind a transition from P to M and then to S by increasing the number of
rich males goes as follows. When there are few rich males, poor females prefer polygyny, as
polygyny increases their chance to be the (second) wife of a rich man, which gives them higher
utility than being the only wife of a poor man. When the number of rich males increases,
poor females prefer monogamy as their chance of having a monogamous marriage with a rich
man is higher. But they do not want to allow for divorce, as they would still have a too high
probability of finding only a poor man as their second husband. Finally, if the number of rich
men increases further, there is a high probability that poor females will be married to rich
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males. These women would benefit from divorce, since it would allow them to get rid of a bad
match, and they are certain to find another rich husband in the second subperiod. When the
number of such females is large enough, the expected gain from divorce dominates its social cost
s borne by all poor women. Notice that serial monogamy is not just an inter-temporal version of
polygamy, whereby some males mate with more than a single female through repeated divorce
and remarriage, but also benefits females who can get rid of a bad match. This echoes the
results in Borgerhoff Mulder (2009).
4.3 Aggregating Individual Preferences: the Rich are the Majority
(φt + µt > 1)
The economy is now located above the downward sloping diagonal in Figure 5. The situation
is less clear and a Condorcet winner might not exist, because of circularities in political pref-
erences. However, after recalling that in (15) and Lemma 6 we have defined pˆ and p˜, we can
introduce a further assumption, which allows us to establish a few interesting results.
Assumption 6 The probability p is not too low, i.e. p > max[pˆ, p˜].
Proposition 5 Under Assumption 6, if the rich are the majority, monogamy cannot be the
political equilibrium.
Proof. Above the diagonal rich people are the majority. Since rich females and rich males
both prefer serial monogamy to strict monogamy (due to Lemma 5), the latter cannot be a
Condorcet winner.
We can also show the following.
Proposition 6 Under Assumption 6, when the rich are a majority, if (i) poor females prefer
serial monogamy to polygyny, and (ii) µ > µ¯, serial monogamy arises as a political equilibrium.
Proof. When the rich are a majority, we already know that monogamy cannot be a Condorcet
winner, and that in particular it would be defeated by serial monogamy in a pairwise contest.
We also know that rich females always prefer serial monogamy to polygyny. If poor females
also prefer serial monogamy to polygyny, µ > µ¯ is a sufficient condition for serial monogamy
to defeat polygyny in a pairwise comparison (since this condition, as stated in Proposition 4,
implies that poor males prefer serial monogamy to polygyny). Serial monogamy would then be
the political equilibrium.
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Therefore, as soon as the rich become the majority, monogamy is replaced by serial monogamy
as the preferred outcome. If the economy is located in the intermediate region of Figure 5,
where monogamy prevails, the transition to serial monogamy need not be driven by an increase
in the number of rich men (see above), but can also follow an increase in the proportion of rich
women (in which case, the economy would move from below to above the diagonal).
Finally, we can show that serial monogamy will ultimately prevail if everybody becomes rich
and p is sufficiently large, while s is not too high.
Proposition 7 Under Assumption 6, for (µt, φt) → (1, 1), serial monogamy is the political
equilibrium.
Proof. As (µt, φt) approaches (1, 1) everybody is rich. Rich females prefer serial monogamy
to any other regime. Rich males might prefer serial monogamy to polygyny if µt is sufficiently
high. If we replace (µt, φt) = (1, 1) in W
P
rm(µt, φt) and W
S
rm(µt, φt), we find that the latter is
higher, provided that p > pˆ, so that Assumption 6 holds. It follows that serial monogamy is
the political equilibrium (by unanimous rule).
4.4 Progressive Enfranchisement
Above (Sections 4.2 and 4.3) we have used majority voting as a way to aggregate individual
preferences, and we have further assumed that every citizen has the right to vote. We have
claimed that the resulting political economy model can describe public decision making even for
periods in which there was no formal voting, or some social groups (women, for instance) were
denied political participation. In Section 2.3, we have also argued that our modeling choice is
backed up by some evidence. In particular, the influence of different interest groups (of males
and females) on collectivist institutions such as the Catholic Church seems to have played a
crucial role in shaping marriage norms in preindustrial societies.
However, our theoretical framework and the results of Section 4.1 can also be used to analyze
the consequences of progressive enfranchisement (of lower-status men, and - later on - women)
for the evolution of marriage institutions.
Such an evolution can be easily reconstructed backwards. For today’s western world, with
universal suffrage prevailing, our theory predicts that Serial Monogamy emerges if the share of
the rich is large enough. Let us then go back in time by less than a century, when (i) women
lacked voting rights, and (ii) there was a majority of poor males. Under these circumstances,
strict monogamy would be the political equilibrium outcome. Finally, if we move back by
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another century or two, we would find a world in which both women and low-status men were
disenfranchised, and therefore rich men could impose polygyny to the society.
Hence, our model is compatible with the idea that the two transitions, from polygyny to
monogamy, and from monogamy to serial monogamy, could have been sparked by the pro-
gressive extension of the franchise, first to poor males and, more recently, to women. This
mechanism, however, is somehow at odds with the historical evidence presented in Section 2.1.
In particular, socially imposed monogamy had emerged well before the extension of the fran-
chise to low-status men.
5 Inter-temporal Equilibrium
So far, we have analyzed how the state of the economy (µt, φt) at time t maps into a marriage
regime through a political economy mechanism. We now want to analyze how the pair (µt, φt)
changes over time and, in particular, how its dynamic behavior is influenced by the marriage
regime. In fact, at time t, the distribution of resources among households is important to
determine the probability that each child has of being rich as an adult.
In principle, the social mobility function might be modelled in a number of different ways,
depending on which factors we believe are most important. For example, individual child
outcomes certainly depend on the amount of parental resources that are devoted to each child.
Focusing on the mother’s consumption, as a determinant of child outcomes, would also make
sense, as well as assuming that the time spent by the father with a particular child is crucial
to socialize the child, transfer her (or him) some relevant knowledge, and allow the child to
benefit from her father’s networks (which are part of his assets). Emphasizing the role of
paternal resources (either material resources or time) would imply, in our model, that children
raised in polygynous households have a lower probability of becoming rich, since men who marry
multiple wives father more children. Indeed, the fact that polygyny might be harmful for child
outcomes seems to be confirmed by several empirical studies. For instance, in contemporary
Africa, children raised in polygynous households have poorer nutrition (Hadley 2005; Begin,
Frongillo, and Delisle 1999; Sellen 1999) and face higher mortality rates (Omariba and Boyle
2007; Strassmann 1997; Defo 1996), a result similar to that obtained by Heath and Hadley
(1998) for the 19th century Mormons in Northern America.
Below, we will assume that the probability that a given child has of becoming rich depends
upon the total lifetime resources of her household, divided by the number of children living
in that household. Such a formulation encompasses the different effects mentioned above, and
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implies that – at the societal level – polygyny hampers overall social mobility, as the resources
of single males cannot be transferred to the next generation, as well as divorce, which being
costly subtracts resources from divorced parents.
In particular, we assume that the probability of a child becoming rich is a logistic function of
lifetime household income per child y:
pi(y) =
1
1 + e
m−y
β
for boys, and p¯i(y) =
1
1 + e
m¯−y
β
for girls.
In line with Assumption 1, we will assume that a girl has always a lower probability than her
brother of becoming rich. This will be achieved by assuming that the location parameter is
lower for boys than for girls: m < m¯. The scale parameter β is assumed to be the same for
both boys and girls.
The dynamic function mapping (µt, φt) into (µt+1, φt+1) depends on the marriage regime in
place at time t. In the P and S regimes, it also depends on which of the three cases prevails.
The dynamic function is therefore a piecewise function with switches between seven different
domains. The first equation of the dynamic system is given by:
µt+1 =


φtpi
(
6
4
)
+ (2µt − φt)pi
(
2 + 4ρ
4
)
+ (1− 2µt)pi
(
2ω + 2ρ
2
)
if P and µt < 1/2
(1− 2µt + φt)pi
(
6
4
)
+ (2µt − 1)pi
(
4
2
)
+ (1− φt)pi
(
2 + 4ρ
4
)
if P and
1
2
≤ µt < 1 + φt
2
φtpi
(
4
2
)
+ 2(1− µt)pi
(
2 + 4ρ
4
)
+ (2µt − 1− φt)pi
(
2 + 2ρ
2
)
if P and µt ≥ 1 + φt
2
φtpi
(
4
2
)
+ (µt − φt)pi
(
2 + 2ρ
2
)
+ (1− µt)pi
(
2ω + 2ρ
2
)
if M
φt
[
ppi
(
4
2
)
+ (1− p)pi
(
4− 2d
2
)]
+ (µt − φt)pi
(
2 + 2ρ
2
)
+(1− µt)pi
(
2ω + 2ρ
2
)
if S and (a)
φt
[
ppi
(
4
2
)
+ (1− p)pi
(
4− 2d
2
)]
+ (µt − φt)
[
ppi
(
2 + 2ρ
2
)
+(1− p)pi
(
2 + 2ρ− 2d
2
)]
+ (1 − µt)pi
(
2ω + 2ρ
2
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if S and (b)
φt
[
ppi
(
4
2
)
+ (1− p)pi
(
4− 2d
2
)]
+ (µt − φt)pi
(
2 + 2ρ− 2d
2
)
+(1− µt)pi
(
2ω + 2ρ
2
)
if S and (c)
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Figure 6: Numerical Example: P (light gray), M (gray), S (darker gray)
The second equation is similar, with φt+1 instead of µt+1 and p¯i() instead of pi(). We are
not going to provide a general characterization of these dynamics, but rather display one
parametric example that highlights some important properties. We first set some parameters
a priori. Assume a logarithmic utility function v(y) = ln(y), and that z = 3/10 (relative value
of second wife), s = 1/20 (social cost of divorce), ρ = 1/10 (income of poor female), ω = 1/5
(income of poor male), p = 1/3 (probability of a relationship turning bad), and g = 2 (utility
of a good relationship). Assumptions 2 to 5 impose some restrictions on the values of the other
parameters. d = 6/10 (private cost of divorce), m = 4/10 (jealousy utility cost), and b = 1
(utility of a bad relationship) satisfy these restrictions. Having set these parameters, we can
draw the different regions in the {µt, φt} space. The left panel of Figure 5 shows the P, M,
and S regions. If the rich are a majority (µt+ φt > 1), there is a very small region where there
is no Condorcet winner to our political equilibrium game. In that small zone, the dynamics
are undetermined.
We now set the parameters governing the dynamics to β = 0.05, m = 0.42 and m¯ = 1.25.
The implications of these parameters for the social mobility of children as a function of the
family type are given in Table 1. These transition probabilities are key to understanding the
dynamics. One key characteristic is that, to become rich, it is necessary for girls to have a rich
father, while, for boys, it is sufficient. Boys from poor families still have a probability of 8%
of becoming rich. This difference between boys and girls can be seen as being at the root of
Assumption 1 and of the whole dynamics according to which growth was first driven by a rise
in µt, then by a rise in φt once monogamy had been implemented.
We plot in the middle panel of Figure 5 arrows indicating the direction of change (µt+1 −
µt, φt+1−φt) as a function of (µt, φt). In the P regime, the arrows point to the right, indicating
that, in this regime, the share of rich males increases over time, while the share of rich female
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Family type total income y piµ(y) piφ(y)
Rich harems 6/4 1.00 0.99
Poor harems (2 + 4ρ)/4 0.97 0.00
Rich couples 4/2 1.00 1.00
Rich/poor couples (2 + 2ρ)/2 1.00 0.05
Poor couples (2ω + 2ρ)/2 0.08 0.00
Divorcing rich couples (4− 2d)/2 1.00 0.95
Divorcing rich/poor couples (2 + 2ρ− 2d)/2 0.83 0.00
Table 1: Social Mobility as a Function of Family Background
remains about constant. This arises because, in this regime, household resources have to be
divided among a large number of children, and this prevents the social mobility of females. In
the M regime, on the contrary, the arrows point to the northeast. This regime is particularly
favorable to the social mobility of females: daughters from rich couples are almost certain to
become rich, while daughters from a couple with a rich husband and a poor wife still have a
probability of 5% of becoming rich.21 The regime S is less favorable to male social mobility
than the M regime, as some resources are lost to the divorce cost d. The arrows suggest that
there is a steady state in this regime.
The result that monogamy particularly enhances the social mobility of poor females is consistent
with the idea, developed by Russell (1929), that the enforcement of monogamy brought about
by Christianity, while in some ways making the position of women worse, especially in the
well-to-do classes, on the whole hastened progress towards a better status of women in the
great bulk of the population.
Starting from initial conditions µ0 = 0.05 and φ0 = 0.049, we draw the dynamic path of
{µt, φt} on the right panel of Figure 5. The economy lies initially in the polygyny regime.
As the share of rich males increases, the marriage regime changes to monogamy after two
periods. Then, monogamy promotes the social mobility of females, and both genders see their
proportion of rich members increase. When the rich become a majority, divorce is introduced
and serial monogamy prevails. This initially lowers the proportion of rich males, but the
dynamics asymptotically converge to a steady state with higher proportions of rich, both males
and females.
Let us conclude this section by a small remark on polyandry. In our model, there is nothing
specific to each gender, except the income of the poor ω ≥ ρ. If we assume ρ = ω, both
21This complements the results of Tertilt (2005) and Tertilt (2006) according to whom shifting to, and/or
enforcing, monogamy increases savings and output per capita.
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genders in the model can be interpreted either as males or females, interchangeably. One could
have then defined a fourth possible institution, polyandry, which would be a “paste and copy”
of our polygyny framework. Polyandry would then be a political equilibrium if the share of
rich females is greater the share of rich males. This probably explains why polyandry did
not arise much in history. As women seems to be overtaking men in terms of human capital
accumulation in most advanced societies, the question whether polyandry could be a future
possible institution in our societies remains open.22
6 Conclusion
We have analyzed the evolution of marriage institutions inside a political economy framework:
monogamy, polygyny or serial monogamy can arise as an equilibrium if supported by the
majority of voters, who belong to four classes (or interest groups): rich males, poor males,
rich females and poor females. Crucial to our analysis is the assumption that, even when they
cannot formally vote, females and poor males can still participate in the political process, and
their interests end up being represented, at least when the political process concerns the choice
of marriage institutions.
After having identified the conditions under which each of these equilibria exists, we show that
a rise in the share of rich males can explain a change of regime from polygyny to monogamy.
This shift arises because, when the number of rich males is high enough, poor females have a
chance to form a monogamous relationship with one of them, and stop supporting polygyny.
The introduction of serial monogamy follows from an enrichment of the society, either through
a further rise in either the share of rich males, or through an increase in the proportion of rich
females. We conclude by stressing four original implications of our set-up.
First, unequal distribution of political power is not a necessary condition to have a transition
from polygyny to monogamy and to serial monogamy. Indeed, we hav shown that this tran-
sition may arise in a standard majority-voting model from changes in the two dimensions of
inequality: among and between genders. Our theory reconciles the “female choice” and the
“male compromise” theories of monogamy, since both female and male preferences concur to
determine the marriage arrangement chosen by the society at a given time. Then, a fortiori,
models putting more weight on certain groups would be able to generate the same pattern.
22A recent example of such a possible trend can be found in the affidavits
filled by Canadian polyamourous families with British Columbia supreme court at
http://polyadvocacy.ca/evidence-filed-with-bc-supreme-court.
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Second, polygyny could emerge as a political equilibrium in a democracy, provided that the
share of rich males and rich females are close enough. In such a case, polygyny is the only
way poor females can aspire to marry a rich husband. Hence, polygyny may well survive the
transformation of states into modern governments, provided that the distribution of income
changes more slowly.
Third, provided that the poor are a majority, monogamy arises as an intermediate regime and
makes the transition towards serial monogamy occur faster. Indeed, monogamy allows to use all
the human resources of the economy to educate children and therefore promotes female social
mobility. This mechanism characterizes monogamy as a precondition for serial monogamy, and
explains why a direct transition from polygamy to its inter-temporal version did not occur.
Finally, we provide the first political economic model of the introduction of divorce laws. Serial
monogamy is not just an inter-temporal version of polygyny, whereby some males mate with
more than a single female through repeated divorce and remarriage, but also benefits females
who can get rid of a bad match. As divorce is costly, serial monogamy arises mostly when the
rich are a majority. But it can also arise in a poor society, if there are enough couples formed
by a rich male and a poor female.
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A Expected Utilities: Polygyny
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B Expected Utilities: Monogamy
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C Expected Utilities: Serial Monogamy
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D Proof of Lemma 6
(A): Assumption 4 implies that rich males always prefer polygyny to monogamy.
(B): The expression for p˜ can be obtained by solving W Srm = W
M
rm:
p˜(µt, φt) =
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(21)
where:
H = (µt − φt)(µt(g − b)− φt(v(2)− v(1 + ρ))− µtφts,
and
J = φt(v(2)− v(2− d))− µt(g − b).
As soon as the probability of their marriage going bad is sufficiently high (p < p˜(µt, φt)), the
expected utility of rich men is higher when the option of divorce is available.
(C): Consider the two extreme situations (µt, φt) → (0, 0) and (µt, φt) → (1, 1). First, when
there is only one rich male (and no rich females, by Assumption 1), serial monogamy coincides
with monogamy, as there is de facto no remarriage possibility for the rich since all other
poor females remain with their poor husbands. Hence, as the rich male prefers polygyny to
monogamy, he also prefers polygyny to serial monogamy. Second, if (µt, φt) → (1, 1), we have
that limµt→1,φt→1W
S
rm > limµt→1,φt→1W
P
rm if p > p˜(1, 1), as polygyny and monogamy coincide.
Therefore, it is possible to identify a threshold function µ˘(φt), such that rich males prefer serial
45
monogamy over polygyny for values of µt and φt belonging to the region between µt = µ˘(φt),
µt = 1 and µt = φt. The threshold function can be determined solving W
P
rm = W
S
rm.
23
23The resulting analytical expression is available upon request.
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